Logics and practices of transparency and opacity in real-world
  applications of public sector machine learning by Veale, Michael
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
09
24
9v
3 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  5
 N
ov
 20
18
Logics and practices of transparency and opacity in
real-world applications of public sector machine
learning
Michael Veale
Department of Science, Technology, Engineering & Public Policy (STEaPP)
University College London
Gower Street, London
m.veale@ucl.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Machine learning systems are increasingly used to support
public sector decision-making across a variety of sectors.
Given concerns around accountability in these domains,
and amidst accusations of intentional or unintentional bias,
there have been increased calls for transparency of these
technologies. Few, however, have considered how logics and
practices concerning transparency have been understood by
those involved in the machine learning systems already be-
ing piloted and deployed in public bodies today. This short
paper distils insights about transparency on the ground
from interviews with 27 such actors, largely public servants
and relevant contractors, across 5 OECD countries. Consid-
ering transparency and opacity in relation to trust and buy-
in, better decision-making, and the avoidance of gaming, it
seeks to provide useful insights for those hoping to develop
socio-technical approaches to transparency that might be
useful to practitioners on-the-ground.
Note to readers: an since-published, extended version of
this paper can be found at: Veale M., Van Kleek M.,
& Binns R. (2018). ‘Fairness and accountability design
needs for algorithmic support in high-stakes public
sector decision-making’ Proceedings of the 2018 CHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
(CHI’18), http://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174014.
Please refer to that one in place of this one.
1 INTRODUCTION
A range of machine learning (ML) systems are being de-
veloped, piloted and deployed in public sector organisa-
tions across the world. 27 actors involved in public sector
ML projects within five OECD countries were interviewed
about their experiences building and deploying machine
learning systems for decision-support, and how they related
to a variety of public sector values often considered broadly
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held or aimed for (see [8]). These projects were ML-based
decision support projects in sectors including child protec-
tion, policing, fire response, taxation, justice and the prison
system, interior affairs and emergency helicopter support.
This paper presents and summarises responses relating to
just one of several salient themes that emerged from these
interviews — how individuals and organisations have navi-
gated practical challenges and choices around transparency
and opacity. The paper does not seek to be a representative
survey; the aim instead is to illustrate the minimum level of
diversity in this area, and present opinions and experiences
rarely discussed today within formal communities consider-
ing algorithmic transparency or accountability.
2 METHOD
27 individuals agreed to be interviewed in late 2016, predom-
inantly public servants and attached contractors either in
modelling or project management. Informants were identi-
fied with an ad hoc sampling approach due to dispersion
of practice, and that no identified public body appears to
maintain a reliable central register of projects. Projects and
contacts were assembled from grey literature, freedom of in-
formation requests, snowball sampling, direct inquiries with
organisation contacts, and the use of news databases includ-
ing Factiva and LexisNexis. Conversations were not recorded
for reasons of sensitivity, and instead all notes were tran-
scribed into long form immediately after the interview ter-
minated. Some terminology was amended to increase the
difficulty of project re-identification. Just over one-fifth of
the informants were female. The U.S. was not one of the
countries containing examined projects, and the 5 countries
from which examples are drawn are spread over three con-
tinents. To organise content, interviews were coded accord-
ing to a common public sector values framework [8] using
NVivo 11 for Mac.
3 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Transparency is often seen as desirable in high-stakes ma-
chine learning systems, and much attention has been di-
rected to its promotion. Many recent voices have high-
lighted the layered nature of transparency [4] or its limits
as a policy approach [6], and work in the HCI and com-
puter science communities over the last two decades on de-
veloping a range of explanation facilities for machine learn-
ing has seen renewed vigour. Yet practitioners are rarely
asked about their opinions, experiences and strategies in
this area. Three main strands concerning transparency and
opacity are highlighted here: transparency for organisational
trust and buy-in, transparency for better decision-making and
opacity to mitigate internal and external gaming.
3.1 Transparency for trust and buy-in
Several interviewed practitioners noted that organisational
pressure led them to make more ‘transparent’ machine
learning systems. Detection systems for fraudulent tax re-
turns illustrate this. The analytics lead at one tax agency
[X1] noted that they “have better buy-in” when they provide
the logic of their machine learning systems to internal cus-
tomers, whilst their counterpart in another tax agency [X2]
described a need to “explain what was done to the business
user”. Both these individuals and the modellers around them
emphasised they had in-house capability for more complex
machine learning systems, such as support vector machines
or neural networks, but often chose against them for these
reasons. Instead, many of the systems that ended up being
deployed were logistic regression or random forest–based.
Some saw transparency in relation to input variables
more than model family. One contractor that constructed
a random-forest based risk score for gang members around
knife crime on behalf of a global city’s police department
[X3] described an “Occam’s razor” process, where they
started with 18,000 variables, working down to 200, then
20, then 8 — “because it’s important to see how it works, we
believe”. To steer this, they established a target percentage
of accuracy with the police department before modelling —
around 75%—which they argued helped them avoid trading
off transparency. When users of analytics are not “confident
they know what a model is doing”, they “get wary of picking
up protected characteristics”, noted the modelling lead at a
tax agency [X4]. To make this more transparent, the police
contractor above [X3] would “make a model with and with-
out the sensitive variables and see what lift you get in compar-
ison”, presenting those options to the client to decide what
was appropriate.
Over and under-reliance on decision support, extensively
highlighted in the literature on automation bias [5, 11], were
highlighted in relation to transparency. A lead machine
learningmodeller in a national justiceministry [X5], allocat-
ing resources such as courses within prisons with machine
learning, described how linking systems with professional
judgement “can also mean that it only is used when it aligns
with the intuition of the user of the system”. To this end some
informants considered how to bring discretion into decision-
support design. A lead of a geospatial predictive policing
project in a major city [X6] noted that they designed a user
interface
to actively hedge against [officers resenting being told what to do
by models] by letting them look at the predictions and use their
own intuition. They might see the top 3 and think ‘I think the
third is the most likely’ and that’s okay, that’s good. We want to
give them options and empower them to review them, the uptake
will hopefully then be better than when us propellorheads and
academics tell them what to do...
Transparency in outputs for discretion had different ef-
fects in different application areas. The former lead of a na-
tional predictive policing strategy [X7] explained
We [use machine learning to] give guidance to helicopter pilots,
best position them to to optimise revenue — which means they
need to follow directions. They lose a lot of flexibility, which made
them reluctant to use this system, as they’re used to deciding them-
selves whether to go left or right, not to be told ‘go left’! But it’s
different every time. There were cases where agents were happy
to follow directions. Our police on motorcycles provide an exam-
ple of this. They were presented with sequential high risk areas
where criminals should be and would go and apprehend one after
another — and said “yes, this is why we joined, this is what we
like to be doing!” The helicopters on the other hand did not like
this as much.
This raised issues around the ‘ethics of following lists’.
The analytics lead at one regional police department, design-
ing a range of in-house machine learning models for both
geospatial prediction and individual offender/victim predic-
tion [X8], sought advice from their internal ethics commit-
tee on how to use the prioritised lists given as outputs
we had guidance from the ethics committee on this. We were to
work down the list, allocating resources in that order, and that’s
the way they told us would be the most ethical way to use them...
It’s also important to make clear that the professional judgement
always overrides the system. It is just another tool that they can
use to help them come to decisions.
3.2 Transparency for decision-making
While the above informants focussed on transparency for
buy-in, others emphasised how they sought practices of
transparency to improve the decisions thatwere beingmade.
One lead tax analyst [X2] described how transparency pro-
vided “value-add, particularly where an administrative deci-
sion needs explaining to a customer, or goes to tribunal.” A
lead of a national geospatial predictive policing project [X9]
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discussed transparency in more social terms how the intelli-
gence officers, who used to spend their time making patrol
maps, now spent their time augmenting them.
We ask local intelligence officers, the people who read all the local
news, reports made and other sources of information, to look at
the regions of the [predictive project name] maps which have high
predictions of crimes. They might say they know something about
the offender for a string of burglaries, or that building is no longer
at such high risk of burglary because they local government just
arranged all the locks to be changed. [...] We also have weekly
meeting with all the officers, leadership, management, patrol and
so on, with the intelligence officers at the core. There, he or she
presents what they think is going on, and what should be done
about it.
A modeller and software developer in the same project
[X10] emphasised the challenges in scaling up these social
practices, as they were not as mobile as the software itself.
If you want to roll out to more precincts, they have to actually
invest in the working process to transform the models into police
patrols. To get more complete deployment advice... it takes a lot of
effort to get people to do that. What you see is that other precincts
usually — well, sometimes — set up some process but sometimes
it is too pragmatic. What I mean by this is that the role of those
looking at the maps before passing them to the planner might be
fulfilled by someone not quite qualified enough to do that.
Similar sentiments were also echoed by individuals in na-
tional tax offices, particularly around the ‘trading’ of models
by large vendors.
Transparency within organisations also arose linked to
the primary collectors of training data. One in-house mod-
eller in a regional police department [X11], building sev-
eral machine learning models including one to predict hu-
man trafficking hotspots, described howwithout better com-
munication of the ways the models deployed worked, they
risked large failure.
Thankfully we barely have any reports of human trafficking. But
someone at intel got a tip-off and looked into cases at car washes,
because we hadn’t really investigated those much. But now when
we try to model human trafficking we only see human trafficking
being predicted at car washes, which suddenly seem very high risk.
So because of increased intel we’ve essentially produced models
that tell us where car washes are. This kind of loop is hard to
explain to those higher up.
Cases like this blur transparency with communication. If
machine learning systems becomemore important in public
organisations, understanding the provenance of the data be-
ing used — and establishing communications up and down
that chain of provenance to understand when logics of col-
lection or cleaning change — becomes important.
3.3 Opacity to avoid gaming
On this topic, other organisations expressed concern that ex-
tensive transparency might encourage system gaming, both
fromwithin, by those using the decision support, and by the
subjects and potential subjects affected by decisions being
made. External gaming is often heard stated as a reason for
opacity. One contractor developing predictive policing soft-
ware for a world city [X3] noted that concerns in his sec-
tor concerned “criminal gangs that might send nine guinea
pigs through the application process looking for loopholes to
get arrested, just to find a tenth that highlights a way they
can reliably get passports from under the noses of the authori-
ties.” An analyst from a large NGOworking in collaboration
with the police on developing a predictive system to detect
child abuse [X12] noted that “it’s much harder to game when
you’ve linked up lots of different aspects, education and the
like”, although their colleague [X13] warned that they were
concerned about many sophisticated practices commonly
used to game child protection systems also being challeng-
ing for ML-supported systems, such as “turning profession-
als against each other” or the “strategic withholding of con-
sent at opportune moments.” The analytics lead at one tax
agency [X1] explained that while they would publicly share
the areas they were interested in modelling tax fraud for,
such as sector or size, they were “primarily concerned that if
the model weights were public, their usefulness might dimin-
ish”.
Yet concerns around gaming do not end with the external
decision subjects. Internal gaming, extensively highlighted
in the public administration literature in relation to targets
and New Public Management [1], was on the minds of many
informants. One tax analytics lead [X2] worried that releas-
ing the input variables and their weightings in amodel could
make their auditors investigate according to their percep-
tion of the model structure, rather than the actual model
outputs — where fairness analysis and bias1 could ostensi-
bly be ‘controlled’.
To explain these models we talk about the target parameter and
the population, rather than the explanation of individuals. The
target parameter is what we are trying to find — the development
of debts, bankruptcy in six months. The target population is what
we are looking for: for example, businesses with minor problems.
We only give the auditors [these], not an individual risk profile or
risk indicators [...] in case they investigate according to them.
There was concern about gaming within tax organisa-
tions, as well as outside it. Some tax auditors are taskedwith
using the decision-support from machine learning systems
to inform their fraud investigations. Yet at the same time,
the fraud they discover feeds futuremodelling; they are both
decision arbiter and data collector. The effect these conflict-
ing incentives might have on a model were highlighted by a
different tax agency [X2]. When auditors accumulate their
1Many informants also explained their approaches to mitigating unfairness
or discrimination in machine learning systems, which will be covered in a
future paper.
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own wages, they noted that “[i]f [an auditor] found an ini-
tial [case of fraud], [the auditor] might want to wait for [the
uncovered] individuals to accumulate it, which would create
perverse incentives for action”.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper sought to provide a short overview of the log-
ics and practices of transparency in the public sector. In
particular, it pointed to some logics for transparency and
opacity that go beyond accountability, concerning organi-
sational buy-in, better decision-making, and avoiding both
internal and external gaming. In the furore around algorith-
mic accountability, the importance of effective transparency
within contexts of use has often been overlooked. Under-
standing these, and other institutional logics, will be key
to both co-designing appropriate social and technical ap-
proaches for useful transparency, and seeing them imple-
mented in important, real-world contexts. Three points are
highlighted in conclusion.
Firstly, techniques to improve transparency on the
ground are often complex, social, and not always apparent
from ‘reverse engineering’ approaches. Public sector actors
have built up considerable social routines to augment or al-
ter, or deliver model outputs in response to challenges found
around the data and the model users. Broad preconcep-
tions that individuals from system design to management
blindly follow data and algorithms are often not just unjusti-
fied, but likely to patronise (and damage potential collabora-
tions) with those deeply involved in building and maintain-
ing such routines. Yet we also know very little about these
practices: how they are, or are not transmitted with the soft-
ware being implemented, how they develop and evolve, and
the tangible impact they have on identifying or mitigating
some of the issues of fairness that have been previously
highlighted. As far back as 2007, academics have been work-
ing with the public sector in these specific areas, undertak-
ing process evaluations of police use of machine learning
for predictive mapping to understand these phenomena [7],
but lately this approach seems to have fallen out of vogue
in favour of attempting to reverse engineer systems, rather
than engage in collaboration to understand the way tech-
nologies are perceived, used and evolved. This is useful, but
limited. Transparency is a process that has both internally
and externally-facing components, and insofar as these are
both important and linked, they require rigorous academic
investigation.
Secondly, while gaming is often suggested as a large bar-
rier to transparency, internal gaming is much less consid-
ered than external gaming. Neither have a good evidence
base in relation to decision-support systems, although the
use of discretion around decision support has been studied
in institutional contexts [2, 3, 9]. The majority of the con-
cern in this area expressed by interviewees was pre-emptive,
rather than based on experience in deployed machine learn-
ing. If true, then internal gaming is of particular concern, as
individuals using the systems also often collect fresh data
— potentially challenging some basic statistical assumptions
of stationarity that underpin bothmachine learning systems
in general and approaches for fairness and ‘debiasing’.
Lastly, transparency has often been highlighted as be-
ing entwined with trade secrets and/or proprietary systems,
yet this was not an issue highlighted by informants. Many
of the public sector machine learning systems found here
were developed in-house or bespoke, in collaboration with
academia, or by paying consultants for time and retaining
the IP. Recidivism systems in the UK and Dutch prison sys-
tems openly publish the model weights for their logistic re-
gression systems [10, 12], while Durham Police have openly
presented the variable importance scores in their recidivism-
anticipating random forests [13]. In general not only were
interviewees open and generous with access to their soft-
ware, but themajority interviewed were well aware of many
of the technical challenges highlighted by research commu-
nities concerned about machine learning and ethics. Some
were even aware of specific pieces of literature in this area
— approaches that they would have liked to test and deploy,
were they available in commonly available, vetted software
packages in open-source programming languages. Trans-
parency might be useful for journalists, or for auditors, but
it is also useful within organisations. Where possible, start-
ing with the needs of machine learning users, working in a
transdisciplinary manner, might often be more fruitful than
only pressuring these organisations from outside.
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